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CAP’s Doing What Works project promotes government reform to efficiently allocate scarce resources and 
achieve greater results for the American people. This project specifically has three key objectives: 
•	 Eliminating or redesigning misguided spending programs and tax expenditures, focused on priority areas 
such as health care, energy, and education
•	 Boosting government productivity by streamlining management and strengthening operations in the areas 
of human resources, information technology, and procurement
•	 Building a foundation for smarter decision-making by enhancing transparency and performance  
measurement and evaluation
This paper is one in a series of reports examining government accountability and efficiency.
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Introduction and summary
A single, streamlined database that tracks fraud, waste, and abuse in federal 
government contracts will help save taxpayers money and reward good compa-
nies. President Barack Obama in a June 2011 executive order charged the newly 
established Government Accountability Transparency Board to start designing 
such a database within six months.1
A week after the executive order was issued, the House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee overwhelmingly approved the 2011 Digital 
Accountability and Transparency Act, sponsored by Committee Chairman 
Darrell Issa (R-CA). The legislation, which is now awaiting a full House vote,  
goes even further than the executive order. 
This bill would set up a Federal Accountability and Spending Transparency 
Board—or FAST Board—to manage a standard process by which agencies can 
report all spending data. The information would be made publicly available on a 
website so that government agencies and watchdog groups alike could identify 
fraud, waste, and abuse.
Issa’s bill, which enjoys bipartisan support at a time of intense political deadlock 
on Capitol Hill, shows that there is momentum in Washington for this important 
issue. But it is only an important first step in the right direction. What we need is a 
wholesale reform of a procurement system gone awry. There is reason for hope. An 
ambitious new pilot project by the General Services Administration is expected to 
be launched in the first half of 2012, the System for Award Management, which will 
combine eight existing federal procurement systems into a single database, a wel-
come step forward if it succeeds. Wise use of good technology can help the federal 
government eliminate unnecessary staff and programs as well as slash billions of 
dollars from the budget by preventing fraud, waste, and abuse.
The federal government today uses dozens of standalone databases to track more 
than half a million business entities that are eligible to bid on the $536 billion in 
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federal contracting for goods and services. Take, for example, Melanie Johnson, 
a Department of Defense contracting officer, who issued in January 2007 a $300 
million contract to AEY, Inc., of Florida to provide weapons and ammunition 
to the Afghan army and police. Seventeen months later, AEY President Efraim 
Diveroli was indicted for fraud on the very same contract, for selling more-than-
40-year-old Chinese ammunition to the government. Later investigations showed 
that there was plenty of available information on AEY and Diveroli that should 
have given Johnson pause—had she known where to look for it.
This is one of the biggest hurdles for government buyers: Bad contractors are 
often hired because government officials cannot locate past performance infor-
mation. The lack of cost, pricing, and technical data is another reason why the 
government ends up paying too much for goods and services.
Charles Smith, a retired military contracting officer who was in charge of the 
$37 billion contract with Halliburton in Afghanistan and Iraq, says that the lack 
of good data on contractors was one of the most significant hurdles in his job. “I 
would say that 90 percent of the data that we needed was not available.”2
To be sure, the Obama administration has made public reams of new data as 
part of the Open Government Initiative on websites such as USAspending.gov 
and through new tool sets like the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity 
Information System, or FAPIIS.3 
These reforms are not sufficient. This report explains the three key types of data 
that contracting officials lack, explores efforts to solve this problem, and issues 
a set of recommendations on how to effectively consolidate data into one single 
database on contract spending. 
We recommend that the federal government:
•	 Create a single, streamlined, governmentwide electronic system to replace the 
multiple existing databases
•	 Adopt a unique way to identify contractors in this database such as by creating a  
“Related Business Enterprise” database
•	 Publish past perfomance data for all contractors in this database
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•	 Make data automatically available unless a genuine reason is established otherwise
•	 Create an easy-to-use online training manual for federal contracting officers
•	 Create an online “budget dashboard” to allow the public to follow federal contract-
ing spending in real time
•	 Make sure that information is accurate and timely by requiring annual inspec-
tions of the quality of this data 
•	 Change the rules on what products and services are deemed “commercial” in 
order to make sure that the government can have access to underlying cost and 
pricing data to negotiate fair prices
•	 Buy technical data from companies that have a monopoly contract in order to 
allow others to compete for the same service and allow market forces to work
A single database will not only ultimately help save money for the taxpayer but will 
also increase competition among contractors and deliver better services to citizens.
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The problem: Shortfalls  
in federal contract oversight 
Contractors historically sold the government everything from “beans to bullets.” 
Over time the range of products has evolved to include billion-dollar weapons sys-
tems and satellites. It has also evolved to include services, including a broad array 
of human resources and even critical military support functions in war zones. 
By some estimates, half of federal workers are no longer employed directly by the gov-
ernment but by private contractors.4 Some of this is a result of a broad experiment in 
the 1990s called Reinventing Government, which attempted to make federal agencies 
more efficient. Today contractors collect income taxes, draw up government agency 
budgets, and take minutes at policy meetings. They sit next to federal employees at 
nearly every agency. More than 7 out of 10 workers are contractors at the Pentagon’s 
high-security Under Secretary for Intelligence office.5 Some of the federal workers in 
charge of contract oversight are themselves contractors.6
All told, the federal government spent $536.4 billion on contractors in fiscal year 
2010 according to the Federal Procurement Data System, more than twice the 
$203 billion that was spent a decade earlier, even after adjusting for inflation.7 The 
biggest spender by far was the Pentagon, which spent $367 billion, or just more 
than two out of every three federal dollars spent on contracting. While much of 
the money went to big-ticket items like aircraft carriers and jet fighters, about $80 
billion in federal dollars was spent on information technology alone.8
This explosion in contracting has not been accompanied, as it should have been, 
with an increase in oversight. Indeed, there are fewer controls today, insufficient 
staffing and funding, and poor-quality data with which to assess contractors’ 
prices and performance. Let’s take each of these problems in turn.
Lack of staff capacity
Agencies do not have enough staff to cope with the explosion in contracting. 
In 1990 the federal government employed 165,739 people in the acquisition 
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workforce, according to an annual survey compiled by the Federal Acquisition 
Institute. By 2000 this had been cut to 122,787 and nine years later had shrunk 
even further to 106,506.9 Some agencies have managed to stay relatively stable in 
terms of staffing. The Defense Contract Management Agency, which had 12,539 
employees when it was created in 2000, still had 11,114 staff by the end of 2010.10
But the numbers do not tell the full story. “Measured in dollars [the acquisition 
workforce] is doing over three times the amount of work, at a higher level of com-
plexity, than it did almost two decades ago,” David Drabkin, acting chief acquisi-
tion officer of the General Services Administration, told the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in April 2010.11 
Lack of sufficient oversight can lead to fraud, waste, and abuse. Exact numbers are 
hard to come by but if the Office of Management and Budget estimate of improper 
payments across government is any indicator, as much as $29.4 billion could be at 
risk.12 Some of this is caught by government auditors: In fiscal year 2010, the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency audits saved about $2.9 billion for the government.13 
A lot more could be saved. The Pentagon, which is both the biggest spender 
as well as the best organized to catch improper payments, does not review a 
very large percentage of its payments. A March 2011 report from the Defense 
Department’s inspector general noted that the Pentagon reported roughly $1 bil-
lion in improper payments—suggesting that less than 1 percent of the estimated 
$125 billion in improper payments across government came from the military.14 
The inspector general was skeptical that the Pentagon was doing enough, not-
ing that improper payments reviews covered less than half of 2010’s first-quarter 
spending. The report also noted that even those reviews were not properly com-
pleted and were sometimes inaccurate. 
 
The Obama administration is aware of the lack of adequate contractor oversight 
and has taken some steps to address it. In April 2009 Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates announced a Pentagon plan to hire 20,000 acquisition staff over the next 
five years to tackle the explosion in contracting.15 Obama in his 2011 budget 
likewise asked Congress to set aside $158 million to hire acquisition officers and 
boost training.16 This laudable effort, however, is a victim of recent federal budget 
cuts. The new hiring initiative was halted in August 2010 pending review.17 
 
In addition to hiring more people, it’s equally important in this fiscally constrained 
environment that existing contracting officers make every dollar count.  
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In the CAP report, “A $400 Billion Opportunity: 10 Strategies to Cut the Fat Out 
of Federal Procurement,” Raj Sharma showed how better planning, negotiation, 
and management in contracting can lead to savings in procurement spending.18
This report takes the next step, examining the kind of procurement data the 
government collects to assess one contractor over the other and negotiate good 
prices for taxpayers. 
It turns out contracting officers have no shortage of federal databases from which 
they glean information about bidders. (see box on page 14) They range from a 
generic registry system such as the Central Contractor Registration, or CCR, to 
specific databases that track environmental violations, such as the Enforcement 
and Compliance History Online system, or ECHO, and occupational safety viola-
tions, like the Severe Violator Enforcement Program, or SVEP.
Each of these databases can play a crucial role in ensuring the best possible vendor 
is selected, but many are never consulted because they are incompatible with 
each other or because the government doesn’t require them to be part of the 
selection process. That’s according to experts like Charles Smith, former head 
of the contracting division of the Army Field Support Command, who worked 
in government contracting for 31 years before he retired in February 2008.19 
Among his other projects, Smith was in charge of the $35.7 billion Logistics Civil 
The government spends even more money 
on grants every year as it does on contracts: In 
2010 the government paid out $557.7 billion 
in grants of which $369.8 billion went through 
the Department of Health and Human Services.  
Unlike contracts that are used to buy goods 
and services that are ultimately owned by the 
taxpayer, grant money is paid out for social 
services like Medicare and Medicaid. But like 
contracts, the grant money is often abused by 
private companies that are paid to deliver the 
services. In 2010 an estimated total of $70.4 billion 
was made in improper payments for Medicare 
and Medicaid health services. Indeed the federal 
government’s own estimates of Medicare and 
Medicaid payment error rates run as high as 52 
percent for certain medical supplies.  Once again, 
the problem is a lack of good-quality tracking 
data to prevent this. In May 2011 the Center for 
American Progress issued a report, “Payment 
Police 2.0,” on this subject. Author Marsha Simon 
concluded that better-integrated databases 
of medical claims that are matched up against 
state and federal death records and other public 
databases will also go a long way towards 
preventing fraud, waste, and abuse. 
Health care fraud
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Augmentation Program contract, or LOGCAP, awarded to Houston-based KBR, 
a former subsidiary of Halliburton, to build and maintain military bases in the 
Global War on Terror.
The lack of good data on contractors was one of the most significant hurdles in his 
job, according to Smith. “I did my best I could to pick the right contractor relying 
on the systems that we had available,” he says. “But we relied heavily on bidders to 
report their relevant past performance to us and they could strategically leave out 
contracts that they could claim to be irrelevant.”20
Smith says he could also request information from other government agencies but 
was concerned about the data quality. “My biggest problem was that contracting 
officers had not properly entered past performance data on old contracts if at all. I 
would say that 90 percent of the data that we needed was not available.”
Next we’ll look at the kinds of data contracting officials have difficulty accessing.
Lack of past performance data
Melanie Johnson, a Defense Department contracting officer, was asked to review 
a 2006 bid by a company named AEY, Inc., to supply $298 million of ammunition 
to national security forces in Afghanistan.21 Seventeen months after the contract 
was approved on January 26, 2007, 22-year-old Efraim Diveroli, president of 
AEY, was indicted for fraud. The company was alleged to have supplied 40-year-
old substandard ammunition to the Afghans. In addition, tens of millions of the 
cartridges were manufactured in China, in violation of U.S. purchasing rules, and 
at least one of the ammo suppliers included a shell company that was on a federal 
list of possible illegal arms traffickers.22 
 
When she was interviewed by congressional investigators, Johnson explained 
that she had asked the Defense Contract Management Agency to review AEY’s 
accounting systems as well as the company’s financial and transportation capa-
bility. She got a positive report from DCMA, she said. 
“AEY had a history of satisfactory performance on similar contracts, showed 
increasing revenue growth, adequate capitalization, and was considered low 
risk for the evaluated capabilities,” DCMA Executive Director Mitchell Howell 
would later tell Congress.23 
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But that wasn’t the whole picture available to government officials. It is true that 
the company was not banned via the Excluded Party List System database that is 
run by the General Services Administration. Multiple previous terminations of 
AEY contracts came to light that had never been recorded in government data-
bases. The State Department also testified that both Diveroli and AEY were on a 
government watch list of potential illegal arms traffickers, a fact never shared with 
the Pentagon. Indeed, Johnson later told committee investigators she was not 
even aware of the existence of the list. An investigation by Government Executive 
magazine later showed that AEY had also been improperly classified as a “disad-
vantaged business” in the year preceding the Afghanistan contract.24 
 
Jeffery Parsons, executive director for Army Materiel Command’s Provisional 
Contracting Command, explained to Congress that the prior terminations had 
been missed because they fell below the minimum threshold.25 He also defended 
the Pentagon’s ignorance of past performance information because the company 
was required to voluntarily submit previous government contract experience with 
the bid. “This case is more about a contractor who failed to properly represent 
their company and failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract 
rather than a faulty contracting process,” Parsons said. Yet the problem with this 
approach to contracting is that most companies would never voluntarily share 
information that could jeopardize a bid.
Lack of cost and pricing data
On November 4, 2004, a contracting officer with the federal health department’s 
Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness issued a notice announcing 
that the agency intended “to negotiate a sole source procurement with BioPort 
Corporation … to provide up to 5 million doses of the Licensed Anthrax Vaccine 
Adsorbed (BioThraxTM) in 5mL multi-dose vials to be delivered to the Strategic 
National Stockpile within 24 months of the contract award date.”26 
 
In a report for the Center for American Progress, Scott Lilly later calculated that 
BioPort Corporation billed the Pentagon $1.3 billion for the vaccine, although it 
had spent just $250 million to manufacture it.27 Normal profit margins on such 
contracts were typically around 10 percent of production costs—nothing even 
close to the 400 percent that BioPort is estimated to have charged.28
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The contracting officials claimed they didn’t know the actual cost to manufacture 
the drug. But this information should have been easy to obtain. The vaccine was 
developed by military scientists at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The factory for the 
vaccine’s production was built by the state of Michigan. And the law permits the 
government to ask what a product costs so that contracting officers can negotiate 
reasonable profit margins. 
The 1962 Truth in Negotiations Act, or TINA, requires companies seek-
ing a negotiated government contract to submit “cost and pricing” data.29 
Unfortunately, TINA does not require cost and pricing data for so-called “com-
mercial” items, which prior to the mid-1990s were defined as items sold to the 
general public in substantial quantities.30 
Government contractors successfully lobbied to have the definition of “commer-
cial” significantly broadened, so that today no one really knows how many high-
margin contracts like BioThrax the government is on the hook for.31 
Most astonishing about this is that the government has no way to recover the money, 
which it was legally obliged to pay under the price negotiated in the contract. “In the 
end, prices are jacked up because the cost data isn’t transparent, and the government 
is the loser,” says Danielle Brian, executive director of the Project On Government 
Oversight. She points out that even system parts of military planes, which have no 
use outside the battlefield, are often classified as “commercial” items.32
Lack of technical data
Colt Defense LLC enjoyed a 15-year monopoly on the production of the M4 gun 
after first receiving a sole source contract in 1994. Because the U.S. Army did not 
buy the technical information on how to manufacture the weapon and open up 
the purchasing to other bidders, Colt Defense has been able to charge monopoly 
prices.33 And this despite the M4’s last-place finish in an Army reliability test 
against three competitors in November 2007.34
In July 2009 the Pentagon finally decided to buy the technical data package from 
the company.35 And in March 2011 it put out a competitive bid request for the 
M4 carbine while also soliciting bids to improve the weapon.36 Weapons experts 
expect that the new contracts will be cheaper and better than the orginal.37
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Both the BioThrax and the Colt case demonstrate the high cost of relying on a 
single source for a product. “How does the government protect itself from price 
gouging when contracts are not competitive?” writes Lilly. “One way is to threaten 
to turn to an alternate provider if a more reasonable price can’t be negotiated.”
Indeed, one of the main ways to make sure that taxpayers get the best value is to 
require “full and open competition,” a practice that has been federal law in vari-
ous forms dating back as far as 1809. The idea is that multiple contractors bidding 
against each other will help keep prices down. Today the rules that govern how 
this should take place are defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation—a system 
of rules based in large part on the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984—that 
requires federal agencies to use either sealed bidding or competitive negotiation.38
And yet a surprisingly large percentage of government spending is not competi-
tively bid. Between 2000 and 2008 awards of such contracts ballooned from $73 
billion to $173 billion. A 2010 Government Accountability Office study showed 
that 31 percent of government contracts in 2009 were never opened up to compe-
tition, while another 13 percent that were opened to competition were awarded 
after receiving only one offer.39
The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in the House of 
Representatives asked GAO to investigate. One of the most common reasons given 
for the failure to compete contracts was that the contracting officers could only find 
“one responsible source.” A major reason for relying on these specific contractors, 
according to the GAO, was that “(f)or services supporting DoD weapons programs, 
the government’s lack of access to proprietary technical data … and very limited 
documentation of the reasonableness of contractors’ proposed prices” has led to a 
“decades-long reliance on specific contractors for expertise.”
With sufficient data in hand, there is an easy, although time-consuming, solution 
to this problem. The government can encourage industry to compete by making 
sure that everyone has enough information to bid on contracts. One tried and 
tested way is to give preferences to small businesses and minority-owned compa-
nies to allow them to grow to the size to ensure that there are more “responsible 
sources” with a track record of selling to the government. Another option is for 
contracting officers to “debundle” (divide into smaller parts) a contract and only 
allow one company to win a part of the business, thereby also allowing others to 
build a track record of selling to the government. Of course such a system is not 
perfect; major contractors have often abused this system by acting as subcontrac-
tors to small or minority-owned companies.40
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Poor-quality data
Another significant problem for contracting officials is that information in govern-
ment databases is not always accurate.
A 2009 GAO report noted that data in the Excluded Parties List System “may con-
tain incomplete information, the database has insufficient search capabilities, and 
the points of contact for information about exclusions are incorrect.” For example, 
the GAO noted that “a party listed as “Company XYZ, Inc.” in EPLS would not 
show up in a search if an agency left out the comma in the name and looked for 
“Company XYZ Inc.” instead.41
The GAO said that it had also “identified businesses and individuals that were able 
to circumvent the terms of their exclusions by operating under different identities” 
such as by registering under fictitious Social Security numbers or changing the 
ownership details for the company.
New databases suffer from the exact same problems. The Project On Government 
Oversight did a study of the newly established USAspending.gov database and noted 
some fairly substantial mistakes. “These irregularities include subsidiaries being listed 
independently of their parent companies, companies being assigned multiple rankings, 
and even a bizarre listing called ‘Government of the United States.’”42 
 
For example, in the FY 2009 top 100 contractor ranking (accessed on April 20, 
2010), the watchdog group discovered:
•	 ITT Corporation appeared twice—#17 and #97
•	 Government of the United States is #22
•	 Northrop Grumman Corporation is #3 and its Northrop Grumman Ship 
Systems, Inc., subsidiary is #35
•	 McDonnell Douglas Corporation, which merged with Boeing in 1997, is #66
The Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System, or 
FAPIIS—a brand new database—has similar problems. A search by the Project On 
Government Oversight on FAPIIS for “Lockheed Martin” produced a list of more 
than 300 companies, “approximately 200 of which were named “LOCKHEED 
MARTIN CORPORATION” but with different DUNS numbers (a unique 
nine-digit identification number provided by Dun & Bradstreet). The rest were 
an assortment of Lockheed subsidiaries including several that were listed multiple 
times with the identical name and minor differences such as commas or the word 
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“INC.” There was even a listing for a “LOCKHEED MARTAIN CORP.” POGO 
staff also tried to find information about a 2008 suspension for IBM but were 
unable to track any such information in FAPIIS.43
Finally, it is important to note that in an era of tighter budgets, poorly chosen 
cuts may actually make procurement less efficient and ultimately cost taxpayers 
more in the long run. 
Lack of funding for good initiatives
This administration has made creative attempts to increase transparency, such as 
by setting up USAspending.gov and FAPIIS, but these efforts are threatened. The 
2011 appropriations bill slashed the $34 million Electronic Government Fund, 
which pays for these efforts, to $8 million, which will effectively reverse public 
access to contract data.44
“While we will continue to work with agencies to improve the quality of data on 
the IT Dashboard and USASpending, we will not be able to fund development 
efforts to improve data accuracy through automation and streamlining,” Kundra 
told Congress in May 2011. “For example, there will be a marked reduction in 
technical support provided to the contractor and grantee communities who 
enter data on federal spending.”45
The USAspending.gov initiative was based on a streamlined model database devel-
oped by the private sector that ironically allowed big businesses that could afford to 
pay for it win yet more business as opposed to leveling the playing field by making 
information accessible to all comers and reduce costs by increasing competition.
Such databases are available from companies like Eagle Eye (now owned by 
Bloomberg), FedSources, and Onvia, who offer a fee-based service to contractors 
to help them analyze previous awards. This includes the ability to research individ-
ual contracting officers to help bidders tailor their pitches.46 While this analysis is 
fee-based, all the raw data is derived from public sources provided by government. 
There are also public service efforts that offer free data tools to analyze contractors 
such as the Project On Government Oversight’s Federal Contractor Misconduct 
Database and OMB Watch’s fedspending.org.
In the next section, we discuss several of these new federal initiatives in greater detail.
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A brief history of recent reform efforts
The first step that any business wishing to sell to the government must take is to 
apply for a listing on the Central Contractor Registration database created under 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. As of November 18, 2011, a 
total of 626,056 entities were registered.47 The Pentagon alone estimated that it 
does business with 235,000 separate vendors.48 
 
Contracting officials have many tools to compare this multitude of potential bid-
ders. For example, the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System, or 
CPARS, is a web-based system that records how well contractors perform. Those 
data are then put into the Past Performance Information Retrieval System, or 
PPIRS, database, which contracting officers can use to choose between vendors. 
Another key database is the Excluded Party List System, or EPLS, which con-
tracting officers are supposed to consult before awarding contracts to make sure a 
vendor isn’t suspended or debarred.
These are just four of dozens of databases federal officials can use. (see box on next 
page) Each uses a different interface, making it hard to obtain a complete picture 
of individual companies and assess them against each other. The Obama admin-
istration’s attempts to address this issue are detailed below. Progress has been 
hampered by the complexity of the existing system, lack of good quality data, and 
by recent budget cuts.
An attempt to combine databases
Under the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress required con-
tracting officers at agencies to check a new database called the Federal Awardee 
Performance and Integrity Information System, or FAPIIS, before issuing any 
contract worth more than $150,000.49
An Alphabet Soup of Contractor Tracking Databases
 1. Central Contractor Registration, or CCR, available at https://www.bpn.gov/ccr/default.aspx.
2. Common Information Data Network Exchange, or CIDNE, available at http://www.issinc.com/solutions/cidne.html.
3. Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System, or CPARS, available at  
     http://nawctsd.navair.navy.mil/Resources/Library/Acqguide/pastperf.htm#2.
4. Department of Defense Revolving Door Database (not public)
5. Enforcement and Compliance History Online, or ECHO, available at http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo/.
6. Electronic Subcontracting Reporting System, available at http://www.esrs.gov/. 
7. Excluded Parties List System, or EPLS, available at https://www.epls.gov/. 
8. Federal Agency Registration, or FedReg, available at https://www.bpn.gov/far/.
9. Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System, or FAPIIS, available at http://www.ppirs.gov/fapiis.html. 
10. Federal Business Opportunities, or FBO, available at https://www.fbo.gov/.
11. Federal Election Commission Campaign Finance Disclosures, available at http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/srssea.shtml. 
12. Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act Information Center, available at http://www.ffata.org/ffata/. 
13. Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation, or FPDS-NG, available at https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsngcms/.
14. GAO Bid Protests, available at http://www.gao.gov/legal/bidprotest.html. 
15. GSA Schedule Library, available at http://www.gsaelibrary.gsa.gov/ElibMain/home.do.
16. Senate and Executive branch lobbying reports http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=selectfields.
17. Online Representations and Certifications Application, or ORCA, available at https://orca.bpn.gov/.
18. Occupational Safety & Health Administration Violations, available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.html.
19. Past Performance Information Retrieval System, or PPIRS, available at http://www.ppirs.gov/. 
20. Public Financial Disclosure Report for Executive branch officials (SF-278), available at http://www.usoge.gov/forms/sf278.aspx. 
21. SEC Filings (EDGAR), available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
22. Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker, or SPOT, available at http://www.bta.mil/products/spot.html.
23. USAspending.gov, available at http://usaspending.gov/. 
24. Wage Determinations On-Line, or WDOL, available at http://www.wdol.gov/.
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FAPIIS is supposed to combine many of the existing government databases to 
allow officials to check if bidders have faced any civil, criminal, or administrative  
proceedings50 The database is also supposed to allow contracting officers to check:
•	 Past performance evaluations 
•	 Records of suspensions and debarments
15 Center for American Progress | How Sunlight Can Improve federal Contracting: Nine Recommendations
•	 Administrative agreements issued in lieu of suspension or debarment
•	 Non-responsibility determinations
•	 Contracts that were terminated for fault and defective price determinations
•	 Incidents that put its employees in harm’s way51
The database is not comprehensive—only data from the last five years are available. 
A number of cases are also excluded—those that are settled without a conviction or 
those that are settled without admission of fault or liability. This means that contrac-
tors now have an even more powerful incentive to make payments or otherwise 
settle misconduct cases to ensure they are never recorded in the database.52
The biggest contractors, who can afford to negotiate settlements, are rarely sus-
pended or debarred: An analysis by the staff of Sen. Bernard Sanders of Vermont 
concluded that Lockheed Martin, which earned $234 billion in federal contracts 
between 2001 and 2010, has been charged a dozen times with government 
contract fraud since 1995. The company has paid fines and settlements of $68.4 
million at the very minimum. Likewise, Boeing, which received $196 billion in 
federal contracts between 2001 and 2010, paid fines and settlements of $88.9 
million or more. And Northrop Grumman, which received $147 billion in federal 
contracts between 2001 and 2010, paid $519.8 million in settlements and fines.53
Unless contracting officers have better data to find out if companies like AEY or 
Boeing have had problems in the past, they may well end up picking bad contrac-
tors. And so long as a company can stay out of trouble for five years after any 
performance problems are reported, the complaints are automatically erased from 
FAPIIS unless someone else calls in to complain. The lack of complaints may sug-
gest that the performance has improved but the company may also have simply 
cracked down on whistleblowers.
It should be noted that although contracting officers are required to use the 
FAPIIS data to judge bidders, they are not restricted to it. The Federal Acquisition 
Regulation allows contracting officers to ask for additional information to determine 
whether FAPIIS data indicate that the contractor had previously been subjected to 
administrative, civil, or criminal review. The contracting officer can, “with the assis-
tance of appropriate specialists,” set “special standards of responsibility” for many 
kinds of specialized goods and services in order to choose a winning bidder.54 As in 
the case of AEY, however, the absence of any warning flags can mean that a contract-
ing officer may not realize that the company has produced shoddy work in the past. 
In March 2010 President Obama promoted FAPIIS, saying: “[W]e’ll be able to 
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see, before any new contract is awarded, whether a company plays by the rules, 
how well they’ve performed in the past.”55 
 
Yet a number of watchdog groups have questioned how well the new database is 
working. A version of the database was released to the public on April 15, 2011, 
and was immediately criticized harshly. The Sunlight Foundation, one of the most 
active transparency advocates in Washington, called it the “worst website” they 
had ever seen, while OMB Watch called it a “steaming pile” and the Fort Worth 
Star-Telegram newspaper blog declared: “New federal website offers so much gov-
ernment transparency it’s invisible.”56 It’s hard to disagree with these assessments. 
The website has numerous broken security certificates, an impossible-to-navigate 
set of choices, a badly designed and redundant “captcha” system to prevent robots 
from using the website—and most importantly of all, almost no data. 
Open government initiatives
The Obama administration has taken a very active role in providing new contract data 
to the public as part of the Open Government Initiative. Some of this is a result of 
the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, a bill introduced 
by then-Sen. Obama and Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) that required the government 
to disclose details of all organizations receiving federal funds beginning in 2007. The 
result was a new website: USAspending.gov, which launched in December 2007.57
In 2009, immediately after the new administration took office, Office of 
Management and Budget Chief Information Officer Vivek Kundra set about 
expanding the information available to the public on procurement at USAspending.
gov, notably by adding the so-called IT Dashboard, a special section on information 
technology buying where progress on federal IT could be monitored directly.58 
“Anyone from agency officials to the American public can now identify and monitor 
the performance of IT projects, just as easily as they can monitor the stock market or 
baseball scores,” Kundra testified before Congress on March 23, 2010. “The Dashboard 
ends the days of faceless accountability. It provides not only the contact information 
for the agency official responsible for the project, but also shows you their picture and 
lets you contact them directly to provide feedback on the project’s performance.”59
OMB monitored the IT Dashboard through “TechStat” accountability sessions, or 
high-level face-to-face reviews of IT programs. Kundra estimates that IT Dashboard 
allowed the government to save approximately $3 billion in annual spending and 
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reduced project completion times from more than two years to eight months on 
average.60 Kundra also launched Data.gov to provide the public a way to easily obtain 
“high value, machine-readable datasets” generated by the government.61
Open government advocates hailed these moves. “The returns from these e-gov-
ernment initiatives in terms of transparency are priceless,” wrote Daniel Schuman, 
staff counsel at the Sunlight Foundation, on March 23, 2011.62
Indeed, making these data available to the public is a good start. Despite the fact 
that USAspending.gov makes available company names and addresses, goods and 
service codes, place of performance, spending figures, degrees of competition, and 
limited socioeconomic information, however, it is far from complete. Quite a lot 
of information such as the requests for proposals, final contracts, specific delivery 
and task orders, any amendments and modifications to the final contract, or how 
the vendor has performed is not available—even though all that information is 
theoretically part of the public record.
The federal government has successfully implemented a more comprehensive 
database for the $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
or ARRA. The creation of Recovery.gov gave taxpayers simple tools to track the 
money in real time such as charts, graphs, and national overview maps that allowed 
users to drill down to specific zip codes. In addition, users were given ways to report 
fraud, waste, or abuse of ARRA funding. The initial results are promising. Less than 
2 percent of Recovery Act contracts and grants were reported for fraud, significantly 
less than the typical 5 percent to 7 percent of projects.
States have also built similar systems successfully. Virginia allows public access 
to a website (eva.virginia.gov) with procurement data such as cost estimates and 
competitive bids and offers. Other states like Arizona, California, Connecticut, 
Florida, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, and North Carolina have similar e-procurement 
initiatives, while other states like Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Texas have used 
strategic sourcing to bundle purchasing and cut costs.63
Other reform efforts
Lawmakers have made other modest efforts, such as then-Sen. Obama and Sen. 
Coburn’s Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in Federal Spending 
Act of 2008, which calls for a web database that contains requests for proposals, 
contracts, scope of work, profit incentive details, and extent of competition.64  
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In May 2010 Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) joined Coburn in introducing the 
Federal Contracting Oversight and Reform Act of 2010, which would have 
expanded FAPIIS.65 Neither bill passed. 
On June 13, 2011, President Obama signed an executive order creating an 
11-member oversight and accountability board to “replicate” across the federal 
government the success of Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, that 
was set up under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to pro-
vide transparency and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. The same day, Rep. Darrell 
Issa (R-CA) introduced the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act that 
made almost the same recommendations. (The Issa bill, however, has some sig-
nificant problems. It rescinds the Coburn-Obama law that created USAspending.
gov. Also, the law is intended to sunset in seven years, which would mean that 
the new database will cease to exist if Congress does not reauthorize it on time. 
That could create problems down the road.)
The Obama administration has also been taking a number of specific steps to 
reduce waste, fraud, and abuse in federal contracting by issuing memos to encour-
age improvements at agencies. For example, in response to recent GAO findings, 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued a memo on September 29, 2011, 
that directed agencies to take steps across government to reduce duplicative con-
tracts for supplies or services.66 Likewise in response to a GAO report that found 
that a number of federal agencies had failed to suspend and debar bad contractors, 
the White House issued a memo on November 15, 2011, directing agencies to 
appoint a senior official to review these policies, as well as provide more training 
on how to implement existing government rules.67 
The General Services Administration is also creating a new “System for Award 
Management,” or SAM, that will combine eight existing federal procurement sys-
tems into a single database to make it easier to track contractor performance. The 
first phase of SAM is expected to launch in April 2012.68 If this effort succeeds, it 
will help resolve many of the issues we have discussed in this report. But it may 
not be easy to implement such a system given how hard it has been to integrate 
older “legacy” government databases. Such efforts have failed in the past and it 
may be wiser to design a new system from scratch than to try to fix what is an very 
complex and broken system in the first place.
The reforms and advances we have described have yielded meaningful change. In the 
next section, we lay out nine concrete steps that Congress and the executive branch 
should take to truly streamline federal procurement and deliver savings to the taxpayer.
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Recommendations
Contracting officials from Alaska to Afghanistan need to have easy and robust 
means to pick the best bidders as well as prevent future fraud, waste, and abuse. 
Here are nine recommendations on how to make that happen.
Replace the complex system of multiple contractor databases with 
a single streamlined government-wide electronic system
The system should store all pre- and post-award contracting records, as well as 
contract evaluation, and allow quick and easy comparisons across multiple plat-
forms. To be sure, there will be an upfront cost to converting over older databases, 
but the money expended on a single integrated system will be considerably lower 
than to maintain 25 different systems. Even if access to certain data needs to be 
restricted, it should be maintained in the same format in order for authorized 
officials to be able to search it easily.
Adopt a unique way to identify contractors in the single database
Federal authorities use a variety of codes—such as Central Contractor Registration, 
or CCR; Commercial And Government Entity, or CAGE; and Dun & Bradstreet 
numbers, or DUNS—to identify contracting entities. None of these are good 
options since individuals can easily obtain multiple codes.
One way to deal with this could be to create a “Related Business Enterprise” data-
base, where the government creates a Contractor Control Number. If a company has 
more than one DUNS number, for example, it would be required to file all of them 
in the Related Business Enterprise database, associated with that Control Number.
20 Center for American Progress | How Sunlight Can Improve federal Contracting: Nine Recommendations
Publish performance data on contractors in the single database
In order to compare two bidders offering the same product at the same price, the key 
deciding factor is going to be how each one performed in the past. It’s not enough to 
simply publish findings of fault or liability. Details of Corrective Action Requests, or 
CARs, and settlements must also be included, in order to identify contractors that 
have repeated problems, and those who pay fines to erase faults. Such data are, in 
fact, published routinely in bid protest decisions made by the GAO.69
Create an automated system to disclose information in the 
database unless a genuine reason is established to withhold 
certain data pending formal review
Automatic disclosure could help reduce the cost and number of Freedom of 
Information Act requests as well as the time required to reply to them.70 Today much 
information is only released when an interested party requests it, and after a time-
consuming and costly review process. The results are then typically released directly 
to only the requester even though all data released are by definition public records. 
Create an easy-to-use online training manual for federal contracting 
officers across government in how to use this new database
While this may seem obvious, it is important to remember that one of the reasons 
why contracting officers are not able to track bad contractors is because they are 
unaware of the many databases that are out there and how to use them.
Create a “budget dashboard”
The government should promote its new tools by developing an online “bud-
get dashboard” that allows the public to follow the actual number of contracts, 
dollar values, and the true nature of competition—to decide for themselves if 
change is occurring. The data should be easy to bulk-download and use in out-
side websites and applications.
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Ensure that information is accurate and timely
Inspectors general and the GAO should conduct annual audits of procurement 
and contractor data quality. 
Narrow the “commercial” designation
The government should change the rules on what products and services are 
deemed “commercial” so that officials have expanded access to underlying cost 
and pricing data. Products that are only or primarily sold to the government are 
not subject to market competition and the taxpayers risk being ripped off unless 
there is a mechanism to prevent profiteering and to negotiate fair prices. When 
government buyers negotiate prices, they must be able to make sure that taxpayers 
do not get ripped off by the inaccurate labeling of an item or service as “commer-
cial,” which prevents them from getting the best deal.
Buy technical data from companies with monopoly contracts
Such data are necessary in order to allow others to compete for the same service 
and allow market forces to work. These data are sometimes priced outside govern-
ment reach but the resulting lack of competition causes quality to fall and prices to 
rise. Government needs to negotiate fair prices for such technical data.
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Conclusion
The award of a contract to a supplier based on lowest evaluated price alone can be 
false economy if there is subsequent default, late deliveries, or other unsatisfactory 
performance resulting in additional contractual or administrative costs. While it 
is important that Government purchases be made at the lowest price, this does not 
require an award to a supplier solely because that supplier submits the lowest offer. 
A prospective contractor must affirmatively demonstrate its responsibility, includ-
ing, when necessary, the responsibility of its proposed subcontractors.
— Federal Acquisition Regulation71
How to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in order to save money and reduce the fed-
eral budget has been an important topic of discussion in Washington for many years. 
Scandals from the $7,600 coffee machine and a $670 armrest in the C-5 cargo plane 
in 1985 to the billions allegedly wasted by Halliburton in Iraq in 2003 have sown 
deep suspicion in the public mind that contractors are out to bilk the taxpayer.72 
 
In order to make sure taxpayers get the best value for their money, federal 
officials rely on complex databases that they can look up to learn about the 
companies that want to get work from the government. Using these databases is 
difficult: Each of the databases is different and thus not easy to compare. Also, 
the data are sometimes inaccurate or incomplete partly because some informa-
tion is self-reported by the contractors.
Contracting officers like Charles Smith will never be able to pick the best contrac-
tor unless we improve and consolidate these databases. Despite the fact that some-
thing like $80 billion is spent on IT systems, no one in the federal government, let 
alone the general public, has any simple way to find out if a contractor has done a 
good job or a bad one in the past. 
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In summary, these are the next steps that the federal government needs to undertake:
•	 Replace the complex system of multiple contractor databases with a single 
streamlined government-wide electronic system that would store all pre- and 
post-award contracting records as well as past performance evaluations.
•	 Adopt a unique way to identify contractors in the single database such as by 
creating a “Related Business Enterprise” database.
•	 Publish past performance data for all contractors in this database.
•	 Create an easy-to-use online training manual for federal contracting officers 
across government in how to use this new database.
•	 Make data automatically available unless a genuine reason is established to with-
hold certain data for official review first.
•	 Create an online “budget dashboard” to allow the public to follow federal con-
tract spending in real time.
•	 Make sure that information is accurate and timely by requiring annual inspec-
tions of the quality of this data.
•	 Change the rules on what products and services are deemed “commercial” in 
order to make sure that the government can have access to underlying cost and 
pricing data to negotiate fair prices.
•	 Buy technical data from companies that have a monopoly contract in order to 
allow others to compete for the same service and allow market forces to work.
The defining principle should be presumption of transparency rather than con-
cealment of information. The value of such information goes way beyond just 
public confidence in the government and the contracting process. With open 
access to information, genuine competition will increase because the emphasis 
will be on quality of production and value to taxpayers, which is ultimately key 
in an era of budget shortfalls.
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